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SALAZAR V. BUONO: THE PERILS OF PIECEMEAL 
ADJUDICATION 
 
Lisa Shaw Roy* 
The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Salazar v. Buono,1 a case 
involving a Latin cross placed on federal land in the Mojave Desert by the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars, approaches what many would assume to be the 
central issue in the case from an oblique.  Does the Mojave Desert cross, 
sitting atop Sunrise Peak in a federal park preserve, violate the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment?  Neither Justice Kennedy‘s plurality 
opinion nor any of the concurring or dissenting opinions in Salazar answers 
that question.  Salazar‘s complicated web of facts and procedural history 
precluded the Court from resolving the most compelling issue in the Sala-
zar litigation.2  Instead, most of the opinions in Salazar circle the merits of 
the constitutionality of the Mojave Desert cross in language ostensibly di-
rected at the remedy—the land transfer statute enacted to preserve the 
cross—but arguably aimed at the cross itself.  On a charitable view, the plu-
rality, concurring, and dissenting opinions simply make the best of the facts 
and law given the tortured path of the case through the lower courts.  But it 
is not folly to speculate that a different path would have presented cleaner 
issues for decision and resolution, and would have given some closure to 
the litigants involved.  Perhaps most important, a decision on the merits of 
the constitutionality of the Mojave Desert cross could have clarified the tra-
jectory of the Supreme Court‘s Establishment Clause doctrine for future 
cases.3 
This Essay briefly reviews the facts and procedural history of Salazar, 
and offers some thoughts on why the litigation may have proceeded as it 
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  130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (link). 
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  See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1814. 
3
  See Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. COLLOQUY 60 (2010) (acknowledging the lack of clarity in the Court‘s Establishment Clause 
doctrine, particularly in cases involving symbols), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/22/LRColl2010n22Lund.pdf (link). 
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Finally, the Essay concludes with a discussion of what Salazar may mean 
for the future of the Supreme Court‘s Establishment Clause doctrine. 
I. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE SALAZAR 
LITIGATION 
In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars donated the Mojave Desert 
cross to the Mojave National Preserve and perched it atop Sunrise Rock, 
where it sat for nearly seventy years without legal challenge.  The cross has 
existed in several forms over the years, but its most recent iteration consists 
of four-inch diameter white metal pipes; the cross itself stands somewhere 
under eight feet tall.4  Citizens have used the area around Sunrise Rock as a 
campsite and have held Easter services at the site of the cross.5  In 1999, 
however, the park service received a request to install a ―stupa,‖ or Budd-
hist shrine, near the cross.6  The National Park Service denied the request 
but announced that it would remove the cross.7  In response to the Park Ser-
vice announcement, Congress passed legislation to prevent federal money 
from being used to remove the cross.8  Meanwhile, Frank Buono, a retired 
National Park Service employee and former assistant superintendent of the 
Preserve, with the help of the local ACLU, sued to have the cross removed 
on the ground that it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution.9  As a retired park service employee who 
regularly visits the preserve, Buono reportedly drove out of his way to 
avoid the cross on his visits, not because of religious offense (he is Catho-
lic), but because he is offended by the presence of a religious symbol on 
public property where other symbols are not also allowed to be displayed.  
Buono obtained an injunction to have the cross removed,10 and the Park 
Service covered up the cross, first with a tarp and then with a plywood box 
during the pendency of the litigation.11  Before Buono obtained the injunc-
tion from the district court,12 however, Congress passed legislation designat-
ing the Mojave Desert cross a national memorial ―commemorating United 






  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1812. 
5
  Id. 
6
  Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205–06 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (link). 
7
  Id. at 1206. 
8
  Id. 
9
  Id. at 1202.  
10
  Id. at 1217.  
11
  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1812–13. 
12
  Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
13
  Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recover from and Re-
sponse to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2230, 
2278–79 (2002) (link). 
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The government appealed the injunction to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, arguing that the Mojave Desert cross did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause and that Buono lacked standing to challenge the monu-
ment.14  While the parties awaited a decision, Congress passed legislation 
barring the use of government funds to dismantle World War I memorials.15  
Congress subsequently entered into the land exchange at issue in Salazar.  
Under the proposed land transfer, the government would give to the local 
VFW the cross and one acre of land on which the cross sits in exchange for 
five acres of land in the same preserve—a parcel owned by veteran Henry 
Sandoz and his wife.16  The statute contained a reverter in favor of the gov-
ernment if the VFW failed to maintain the property as a ―war memorial,‖17 
but, given that the Sandozes had maintained the cross display since 1998, it 
was safe to assume that they would continue to maintain not just any me-
morial, but the cross that historically had been displayed at the site.18 
When the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision on the injunction appeal, 
the government lost on both the merits and the standing issues.19  Rather 
than appeal the Ninth Circuit‘s decision on the injunction to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, however, the government allowed the time for appeal to lapse.  
Meanwhile, Buono challenged the land transfer in the district court on the 
ground that the transfer violated the injunction.  Specifically, Buono charac-
terized the land transfer as an unconstitutional ruse to keep the cross in 
place, rather than a legitimate attempt to comply with the original injunc-
tion.20  The government lost,21 appealed, and lost for the second time in the 
Ninth Circuit.22  This time, however, the government sought review from 
the U.S. Supreme Court on the issues of whether the land transfer violated 
the injunction and whether Buono had standing to challenge it in the first 
instance, but not whether either the Mojave Desert cross or the land transfer 





  Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004) (link). 
15
  Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 
1519, 1551 (2002) (link).  Previously, Congress had passed legislation that barred the use of government 
funds to dismantle the Mojave Desert cross.  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-
554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-230 (2001) (link). 
16
  Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121, 117 Stat. 1054, 
1100 (2003); Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1813. 
17
  Id. 
18
  Henry and Wanda Sandoz had maintained the cross since 1983.  In 1998 Mr. Sandoz constructed 
the most recent version of the monument.  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1812.  According to Sandoz, he made a 
promise to a dying veteran to preserve the monument.  Mojave Cross, Religion & Ethics News Weekly 
(Oct.2, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/episodes/october-2-2009/mojave-cross/4424/ 
(link). 
19
  Buono, 371 F.3d at 548, 550. 
20
  Buono, 364 F. Supp. at 1178. 
21
  Id. at 1182. 
22
  Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007). 
23
  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (I), Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472). 
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and procedural history before the Supreme Court left it with few options 
other than to dispose of the case on standing grounds (an unlikely result), to 
reconcile the land transfer statute with the final injunction, or to find that 
the land transfer violated that injunction. 
II. THE SALAZAR OPINIONS24 
Justice Kennedy‘s plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts 
and joined in part by Justice Alito, grudgingly acknowledges the District 
Court‘s decision, affirmed on appeal, that the Mojave Desert cross violates 
the Establishment Clause.25  On the issue of whether the land transfer can be 
squared with the injunction, however, the plurality remanded the case so 
that the district court could consider the ―change of law‖ created by con-
gressional action.26  According to the plurality, the land transfer resulted 
from a ―congressional statement of policy applicable to the case‖ that the 
district court failed to consider: the policy of accommodation.27  According 
to the plurality, ―[t]he Constitution does not oblige government to avoid any 
public acknowledgment of religion‘s role in society.  Rather, it leaves room 
to accommodate divergent values within a constitutionally permissible 
framework.‖28 
Given the plurality‘s broad statements about the virtues of accommo-
dation and the district court‘s supposed error in that regard, it seems curious 
that the plurality did not simply decide the issue in favor of the government.  
The additional reason given for the remand is not particularly persuasive.  
Justice Kennedy stated that the district court‘s original injunction was based 
on the perception of endorsement under the ―effect‖ prong of Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,29 while the court later enjoined the land transfer based on con-
gressional intent, i.e., the ―intent‖ prong of Lemon.30  Putting aside the ques-
tions of whether this analysis metastasizes Lemon into several doctrines 





  Excluded here is any discussion of the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts and the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Breyer.  Neither Justice seems to believe that Salazar presents any live Estab-
lishment Clause issues.  See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1821(Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1842 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).  Likewise, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concludes that Buono lacked stand-
ing.  See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1824 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Scalia‘s concur-
rence appears to follow a recent trend of disposing of controversial church and state disputes on standing 
grounds.  See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc, 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (link); Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (link). 
25
  See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1815. 
26
  Id. at 1818. 
27
  Id. 
28
  Id. at 1818–19 (citations omitted). 
29
  403 U.S. 602 (1971) (link). 
30
  See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1819. 
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of the injunction,31 the question itself points to a very simple fix.  The dis-
trict court need only rephrase its earlier conclusion to declare that a reason-
able observer would perceive the land transfer as an attempt by Congress to 
endorse religion.  Why the plurality demands that the district court spell out 
this conclusion on remand is a puzzle, unless the plurality expects the dis-
trict court to reach a different one.32 
Justice Kennedy‘s plurality opinion rests on very narrow ground; none-
theless, it states some broad propositions about the Establishment Clause.  
While distancing itself from the lower court decision, the plurality notes 
that ―[t]he goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does not require 
eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm.‖33  The opinion 
leaves little doubt about how the plurality would have decided the case on 
the merits of the constitutionality of the Mojave Desert cross; likewise, 
there is little doubt about the direction the plurality expects the district court 
to take on remand. 
Justice Alito would avoid this extra step; his concurrence reaches out 
to hold that the land transfer does not violate the injunction at all.34  Justice 
Alito‘s opinion recasts the characterization of the Mojave Desert cross in 
unmistakable terms: 
 
[T]he original reason for the placement of the cross was to 
commemorate American war dead and, particularly for 
those with searing memories of The Great War, the symbol 
that was selected, a plain unadorned white cross, no doubt 
evoked the unforgettable image of the white crosses, row 
on row, that marked the final resting places of so many 
American soldiers who fell in that conflict.35 
 
For the dissenters, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and So-
tomayor, provided a forceful defense of the district court‘s finding of en-
dorsement.36  Justice Stevens recognized the obvious: that Congress 
intended the land transfer to preserve the cross.37  Moreover, because Con-
gress designated the cross a national memorial, the lower court‘s finding of 





  Ironically, in the lower court proceedings following Lemon, the Court was more generous when it 
considered whether a subsequent injunction fulfilled the Court‘s mandate in that case.  See Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (link). 
32
  See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1820–21 (suggesting that the district court on remand should analyze 
the land transfer in the context of ―all relevant factors‖ including the congressional policy of accommo-
dation). 
33
  Id. at 1818. 
34
  Id. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring). 
35
  Id. at 1822. 
36
  Id. at 1832–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
37
  Id. 
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sits on public or private land.38  Speaking directly to the plurality, Stevens 
rejected the proposition that a congressional motive of accommodation 
could overcome a finding of endorsement of religion.39  Justice Stevens hig-
hlighted the significance of the cross as a sectarian symbol throughout the 
dissent, and he countered the plurality‘s and Alito‘s contrary characteriza-
tions as an attempt to re-decide the underlying issue of whether the Mojave 
Desert cross violates the Establishment Clause.40 
III. THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE 
The reason that the opinions in Salazar fail to squarely address the is-
sue of whether the Mojave Desert cross violates the Establishment Clause is 
simple: the district court‘s injunction and the finding upon which it was 
based, affirmed in the Ninth Circuit, became final and binding res judicata 
when the government failed to timely appeal that earlier decision to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.41  (As if to deflate any contrary expectations, Justice 
Breyer noted at oral argument that the only remaining legal dispute in the 
case was the ―very technical boring issue‖ of whether in enacting the land 
transfer statute the government would be in compliance with the injunc-
tion.42)  It follows, then, that the proximate reason that the issue was forec-
losed amounted to the government‘s decision not to appeal the Ninth 
Circuit‘s original adverse ruling.43  That decision may have left some scrat-
ching their heads.  If the government wanted to win, why not press its case 
all the way to the Supreme Court? 
Had the Supreme Court been tasked with discerning the constitutionali-
ty of the Mojave Desert cross itself, the government would have had at its 
disposal some strong arguments based on a pair of 2005 Supreme Court 
Ten Commandments decisions—Van Orden v. Perry44 and McCreary 





  Id. 
39
  Id. at 1838–40. 
40
  Id. at 1839. 
41
  Id. at 1815 (―The District Court granted the 2002 injunction after concluding that a cross on fed-
eral land violated the Establishment Clause.  The Government unsuccessfully challenged that conclusion 
on appeal, and the judgment became final upon direct review. . . .  The Government therefore does not—
and could not—ask this Court to reconsider the propriety of the 2002 injunction or the District Court‘s 
reasons for granting it.‖). 
42
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472) (link). 
43
  I assume for the purpose of this essay that the Department of Interior would have wanted to ob-
tain a judgment from the Supreme Court that overturned the Ninth Circuit ruling but either made a stra-
tegic decision not to petition for a grant of certiorari to obtain such a judgment or simply missed the 
deadline for filing an appeal. 
44
  545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding the constitutionality of a 40-year old Ten Commandments dis-
play donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles) (link). 
45
  545 U.S. 844 (2005) (striking down a relatively recent government display including the Ten 
Commandments) (link). 
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gree, reminiscent of the 40-year Texas Ten Commandments display upheld 
in Van Orden.  Unlike the Ten Commandments display struck down in 
McCreary, the Mojave Desert cross was donated by the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars, rather than having been commissioned by the government.  Likewise, 
the Mojave Desert cross had a long usage as a commemoration of the war 
dead, in addition to its religious use as a site for Easter services.46  In his 
contribution to this symposium, Professor Lund stresses the profound reli-
gious significance of the cross to Christian believers, a fact which distin-
guishes it from the Ten Commandments—and no doubt he is right.47  Yet 
the history of the cross as a symbol of the slain, regardless of whether that 
meaning also has a religious connotation and regardless of its effect on 
those who do not embrace that connotation, resonates more closely with the 
prevailing view in Van Orden.48  Nevertheless, neither Van Orden nor 
McCreary had been decided at the time of the Ninth Circuit‘s decision 
upholding the district court‘s finding of unconstitutionality.  In fact, the 
Ninth Circuit issued a decision on the merits in June of 2004,49 and the 
deadline to appeal passed two months later.  The Supreme Court did not 
grant certiorari in Van Orden and McCreary, however, until October of that 
year.50  Therefore, the government in its second appeal to the Ninth Circuit 
was left with the argument that the decisions in Van Orden and McCreary 
made the original injunction moot, a position the Ninth Circuit apparently 
rejected.51 
Without Van Orden and McCreary to provide a template for Supreme 
Court litigation involving religious symbols, the government likely ana-
lyzed the potential fate of the Mojave Desert cross under the Court‘s prior 
pair of symbols cases—Lynch v. Donnelly52 and County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU.53  A critical factor in evaluating the application of those cases was 
probably an attempt to predict the vote of Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor, 





  Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid O‘Scannlain made precisely these arguments in his dissent to the 
denial of rehearing en banc.  See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2008) (denial of 
rehearing en banc) (O‘Scannlain, J., dissenting) (link). 
47
  See Lund, supra note 3, at 64–65. 
48
  See infra p. 83; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1817 (citing Justice Breyer‘s concurrence in Van Orden); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691–92 (―The in-
clusion of the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance, partaking of both 
religion and government.‖). 
49
  See Buono v. Kempthorne, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004). 
50
  See Van Orden v. Perry, 543 U.S. 923 (2004); McCreary County v. ACLU, 543 U.S. 924 (2004). 
51
  See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d at 764 (O‘Scannlain, J., dissenting) (noting that the court 
failed to mention the argument). 
52
  465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
53
  492 U.S. 573 (1989).  Stone v. Graham, an earlier case applying the Lemon test, involved a Ken-
tucky statute that required the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public school classroom.  449 
U.S. 39 (1980). 
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adopted by the Supreme Court in County of Allegheny.54  Although the 
Court in Lynch upheld the crèche in that case—a manger scene surrounded 
by a hodgepodge of Christmas holiday fare55—a plurality of the Court in 
County of Allegheny applied O‘Connor‘s endorsement test to strike down a 
stand-alone crèche in a county courthouse.56  The endorsement test, the 
framework the district court used to invalidate the Mojave Desert cross,57 
has been applied in numerous lower court cases to invalidate other religious 
displays.58  Whether the Supreme Court would have applied the endorse-
ment test and how Justice O‘Connor would have voted were two big ques-
tions that the government likely could not answer with any degree of 
certainty.59 
Viewed in light of this ambiguity, the government‘s decision (assum-
ing it was a decision) to let the time for appeal of the injunction lapse and 
defer to Congress to solve the problem made sense.  Congress postponed 
the need to ponder doctrinal uncertainties when it enacted the land trans-
fer.60  Congressional action represented an easy solution by a group of ac-
tors who were politically motivated to preserve the veterans‘ memorial 
cross.  Ultimately, however, congressional action must pass constitutional 
muster, and the final arbiter of that question is the United States Supreme 
Court.  So one way or another, one would expect that the issue of the con-
stitutionality of the Mojave Desert cross would likely end up before the Su-
preme Court—if not on its own, then tangled up in the legislation designed 
to keep the cross in place. 
Unfortunately, Salazar presented the issue of the constitutionality of 





  Justice O‘Connor‘s articulation of the endorsement test focuses on whether government symbols 
send ―a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, 
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.‖  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O‘ Connor, J., concurring).  O‘Connor added that ―[d]isapproval 
sends the opposite message.‖  Id. 
55
  Id. at 687. 
56
  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (link).  In Allegheny, a plurality of the Court 
distinguished Lynch on the ground that the crèche in that case had been surrounded by other items that 
detracted from its religious message, while the crèche in the county courthouse stood alone.  Id. at 598. 
57
  Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp.2d 1202, 1216-17 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
58
  See, e.g., Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987) (link); ACLU v. 
City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986) (link). 
59
  Although Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test focuses on whether nonadherents are made to feel 
like outsiders, this expansive understanding of the Establishment Clause conflicts with O‘Connor‘s ap-
proval of civil references to religion such as the Pledge and ―In God We Trust‖ on the currency, some-
times described as ―ceremonial deism.‖  On more than one occasion O‘Connor defended the doctrine of 
ceremonial deism, notably in her concurrence in the Pledge of Allegiance case, in which she argued that 
one factor weighing in favor of the Pledge was its ―history and ubiquity.‖  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37–38 (2004) (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
60
  Cf, e.g., Mercier v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005) (link); Freedom 
From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F. 3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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occasionally pierce through to the merits, and also provide some insight in-
to the Justices‘ views regarding the Court‘s Establishment Clause doctrine. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE SUPREME COURT‘S JURISPRUDENCE OF 
MONUMENTS AND SYMBOLS 
Although the Salazar decision does not directly address the constitu-
tionality of the Mojave Desert cross, the case does provide some potential 
insight into the current Court‘s approach to religious monuments and sym-
bols.  It can be argued that a slim majority of the Court now favors the prin-
ciple of accommodation.  Justice Kennedy‘s plurality decision makes the 
case for accommodation in broad terms, and Justice Alito‘s concurrence 
strikes a similar chord.61  Justices Scalia and Thomas would have denied the 
plaintiff standing to challenge the land transfer, but both Justices have been 
stalwart supporters of the principle of accommodation in the past.62  Even 
Justice Breyer has stated previously that cultural strife may be avoided 
when the Court‘s Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not demand re-
moval of every longstanding religious symbol from the public square.63 
The fact that a majority of the Court appears to support the principle of 
accommodation of religion raises certain implications for the endorsement 
test.  Some of the commentary on the meaning of the Salazar opinions in-
volves speculation about whether the Supreme Court continues to be com-
mitted to Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test as a measure of the 
Establishment Clause.64  In an earlier article on the Court‘s government 
speech decision in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, I argued that Justice 
Alito‘s majority opinion signaled a possible retreat from the endorsement 





  The Chief Justice‘s somewhat cryptic concurrence reveals no motive to effect a doctrinal sea 
change, but the fact that he joined in Justice Kennedy‘s plurality opinion is sufficient to show agreement 
with the dicta in support of accommodation. 
62
  See. e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139–40 (2009)(Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (link); McCreary, 545 U.S. 844, 905 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (link). 
63
  Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677, 703 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
64
  See Ian Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 31 (2010), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/20/LRColl2010n20Bartrum.pdf (link); 
Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The Cross Between Endorsement and History, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 42 (2010), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2010/09/salazar-v-buono-the-cross-
between-endorsement-and-history.html (link); see also David G. Savage, Supreme Court Allows Mojave 
War Memorial Cross, L.A. TIMES.COM, Apr. 29, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/29/nation/la-
na-court-cross-20100429 (noting that Justice O‘Connor had employed the endorsement test, and that the 
decision in Salazar suggests that the Supreme Court has ―shifted somewhat to the right‖) (link). 
65
  See Lisa Shaw Roy, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: Monuments, Messages, and the Next Es-
tablishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 280 (2010) 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/5/LRColl2010n5Roy.pdf (link).  But see 
Dolan, supra note 64, at 52 (summarizing Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: 
Establishment Clause Limits After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J., (forthcoming 2010)). 
105: 72 (2010)  The Perils of Piecemeal Adjudication 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/23/ 81 
seemed to suggest in Summum that the Court no longer views monuments 
and symbols through an exclusively outsider lens.  Alito stated that a mo-
nument ―may be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted 
by different observers in a variety of ways.‖66  Particularly in the context of 
symbols and displays, without a reasonable observer who can discern a 
message of exclusion the endorsement test loses much of its content. 
Now, in Salazar, a case that began as litigation under the Establish-
ment Clause, Justice Alito‘s concurrence and Kennedy‘s plurality opinion 
appear to confirm the move from no-endorsement toward its opposite pole, 
accommodation.67  The accommodation to which the Court referred shifts 
the focus away from whether a hypothetical observer may perceive an ex-
clusionary message.  Instead, as its definition suggests, accommodation re-
quires that the parties attempt ―a reconciliation of differences,‖68 and it 
invites potential litigants to make peace with some traces of religion in pub-
lic life.  Commentators have recognized that an unyielding Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence leaves the losing side no less alienated than the group 
prevailing in a lawsuit.69  One can only imagine the stakes being higher in 
the case of the proposed removal of a veteran‘s memorial, a lone cross in a 
remote desert outpost.  Picking up on this intuition, Justice Alito repeatedly 
warned that the alternative to accommodation would lead to the ―disturbing 
symbolism‖ of the dismantling of the Mojave Desert cross and other sym-
bols and monuments like it.70 
Nonetheless, the shift to accommodation in Salazar is made piecemeal, 
and for that reason, there is room for disagreement about the direction of the 
Court‘s symbols and monuments cases.  For example, in contrast to my ex-
planation, Professor Mary Jean Dolan argues in her symposium piece that 
Justice Alito‘s opinion in Summum and his concurrence in Salazar, along 
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ing Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135). 
67
  In Salazar, for example, Justice Alito asserts that observers of the Mojave Desert cross ―appear to 
have viewed it as conveying at least two significantly different messages.‖  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1822 
(Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Summum 129 S. Ct. at 1135). 
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  Accomodation Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/accommodation (last visited Sept. 18, 2010) (link). 
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  See, e.g., Richard M. Esenberg, Must God Be Dead or Irrelevant: Drawing a Circle That Lets Me 
In, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2009); Lisa Shaw Roy, The Establishment Clause and the Concept 
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  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1823–24 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (re-
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derstanding of monuments that is the hallmark of the endorsement test.71  
Professor Dolan therefore suggests that in Salazar, the endorsement test‘s 
basic inquiry survives alongside accommodation as two points on a conti-
nuum rather than as opposite poles.72  While plausible, this interpretation 
fails to adequately account for the fact that Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement 
test focuses on the message conveyed to a religious outsider,73 but the Sala-
zar plurality and Justice Alito‘s concurrence do not.74  Under the endorse-
ment test, a key question is whether a reasonable observer who views the 
Mojave Desert cross would perceive a message of religious exclusion.75 
On the other hand, Justice Alito‘s concurrence in Salazar notes that 
multiple observers have understood the Mojave desert cross to convey ―at 
least two significantly different messages‖—one religious, and one histori-
cal.76  Moreover, the fact that Justice Alito‘s Salazar concurrence expands 
the discussion to include observers who would be offended by the symbol-
ism of having the cross removed runs counter to the logic of the endorse-
ment test.77  In fact, nowhere in Salazar does Justice Alito connect the 
―disturbing symbolism‖ of the destruction of the monument with the per-
ceptions of the endorsement test‘s ―reasonable observer.‖78  Rather, to the 
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currence in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687)). 
76
  Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1822 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
77
  There is one possible argument that Justice Alito‘s observations may be harmonized with the en-
dorsement test.  Justice O‘Connor‘s initial formulation of the endorsement test contained a sentence that 
recognized the possibility of government disapproval of religion which presumably could lead to an Es-
tablishment Clause violation.  See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).  Nonetheless, to 
consider whether a monument‘s demolition, deemed necessary under the endorsement test, constitutes 
disapproval of religion under the same test, would collapse the test.  Cf., e.g., Vasquez v. Los Angeles 
County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1257 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument that removing of cross from county 
seal evinced hostility to Christianity) (link). 
78
  See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1823–24 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
105: 72 (2010)  The Perils of Piecemeal Adjudication 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/23/ 83 
proper application of the endorsement test, it seems, as the plurality notes 
from the outset, that it is simply constrained by res judicata.79 
The potential ascendancy of accommodation, however, presents chal-
lenges for its advocates.  Professor Stanley Fish maintains that to ―de-
religionize‖ a monument to argue in support of its constitutionality is disin-
genuous; of course everyone knows that the cross is a religious symbol.80  
This assertion, while true, oversimplifies Justice Kennedy‘s argument in an 
important respect.  The Mojave Desert cross is religious and secular at the 
same time; Kennedy‘s argument rests on a ―both and‖, rather than an ―ei-
ther or‖ proposition.81  In many cases, the religious aspect of the symbol is 
an irreducible and historically-identified component.  A virtue of accom-
modation is that it does not demand a choice between two undesirable ex-
tremes—on the one hand, an obsessive focus on religion to the exclusion of 
important historical and cultural realities; and on the other, an implausible 
denial of a symbol‘s religious character. 
Perhaps a more serious challenge for religionists is the assertion that 
they can only obtain something of a Pyrrhic victory when the constitutional-
ity of a religious symbol like the cross rests on the conclusion that the cross 
is also secular.  As Professor Bartrum explains in his contribution to this 
symposium, a legal doctrine that emphasizes the secular aspects of a reli-
gious symbol arguably empowers the state to exercise a ―corruptive power‖ 
over religion.82  He reminds us of the revival of scholarship on the legacy of 
Roger Williams, founder of Rhode Island and the intellectual forebear of 
modern-day evangelicals, who adamantly opposed state intrusion into the 
garden of religious life.83  Nonetheless, it is far from clear that eighteenth 
century evangelicals would have opposed public religious symbols and mo-
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ern-day counterparts, the litigation of these issues reveals that religionists 
themselves appear to perceive little internal threat from Supreme Court 
statements about the secular character or appeal of religious symbols.85 
But all of this is not to suggest that we know precisely what accommo-
dation means or what its limits are.86  In the context of symbols and monu-
ments accommodation may still be ―a label, not a theory.‖87  If 
accommodation is, in fact, the Court‘s new direction, then it will be impor-
tant to understand its scope, and Salazar, unfortunately, does not aid in that 
process.88 
CONCLUSION 
The long-awaited decision in Salazar v. Buono offers a partial view in-
to the future of the Court‘s Establishment Clause doctrine.  The decision 
would have offered a nearly perfect window if the constitutionality of the 
Mojave Desert cross had been the central issue in the case.  Instead, the pie-
cemeal litigation in Salazar leaves us with many unanswered questions, and 
perhaps more litigation ahead.  Salazar returns the dispute to the district 
court for a re-evaluation of the propriety of the land transfer.  We are told 
that, on remand, the district court is to consider the policy of accommoda-
tion.89  Perhaps we are also told that, in the coming years, a majority of the 
Supreme Court will be guided by it as well. 
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